Outward FDI and domestic input distortions: evidence from Chinese Firms by Chen, C et al.
Title Outward FDI and domestic input distortions: evidence fromChinese Firms
Author(s) Chen, C; Tian, W; Yu, M
Citation The 2015 Fall Meeting of the Midwest International EconomicsGroup, Pennsylvania State University, PA., 23-25 October 2015.
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/226583
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Outward FDI and Domestic Input Distortions: Evidence from
Chinese Firms
Cheng Cheny Wei Tianz Miaojie Yux
August 30, 2015
Abstract
This paper studies how discriminations against private enterprises (i.e., non-state-owned
enterprises or non-SOEs) in the domestic market a¤ect rms investment and production
strategies abroad. We rst document three puzzling empirical ndings using data on Chinese
multinational companies (MNCs). First, private MNCs are less productive than state-owned
MNCs. Second, SOEs are less likely to undertake FDI. Third, relative size of state-owned
MNCs (compared with non-exporting or non-FDI rms) is larger than that of private MNCs.
A theoretical model is built to rationalize these facts. The economic force is that distortions
in the domestic input market incentivize private rms to invest and produce abroad, which
results in less tougher self-selection into FDI for those rms. Compared with state-owned
MNCs, private MNCs allocate output disproportionately more in the foreign market, and
their size increases disproportionately when they become MNCs. All such theoretical pre-
dictions are strongly supported by the rm-level data of China.
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the emergence of multinational corporations (MNCs) are
dominant features of the world economy nowadays.1 In 2013, world FDI inows reached the level
of 1:47 trillion US dollars, and global FDI stock was roughly 26 trillion US dollars, surpassing
GDP of any country in the world (UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015). Moreover, almost
all rms listed in Fortune 500 are MNCs, and MNCs are by far the largest rms in the global
economy. Therefore, understanding the behavior of MNCs and patterns of FDI is important, if
we want to analyze aggregate productivity and resource allocation of the modern economy.
The sharp increase in outward FDI from developing countries in the past decade is phenom-
enal, and this is especially true for China. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015 shows that
outward FDI ows from developing economies has already accounted for more than one third of
overall FDI ows, up from 13% in 2007. Furthermore, despite that global FDI ows plummeted
by 16% in 2014, MNCs from developing economies invested almost 468 billion US dollars abroad
in 2014, a 23% increase from the previous year.2 As the largest developing country in the world,
China has seen an astonishing increase in its outward FDI ows in the past decade. In 2012,
Chinas outward FDI reached the level of 6:5% of the worlds total FDI ows, which made China
the third largest home country of FDI outows globally. In addition, there are more than 15
thousand Chinese MNCs (parent rms) now, which is comparable to the number of MNCs of
any developed economy in the world. Moreover, outward FDI ows from China have increased
by 37.8 times in the past ten years, while GDP and trade volume of China have increased by less
than fourfold during the same period. Finally, outward FDI ows from China were 140 billion
US dollars in 2014, surpassing the inward FDI ows to China which were 119 billion US dollars
in the same year. In total, behavior of Chinese MNCs and patterns of outward FDI ows from
1MNCs refer to rms that own or control production of goods or services in countries other than their home
country. FDI includes mergers and acquisitions (M&A), building new facilities, reinvesting prots earned from
overseas operations and intra company loans.
2The UNCTAD World Investment Report also demonstrates that FDI stock from developing economies to
other developing economies grew by two-thirds from 1.7 trillion US dollars in 2009 to 2.9 trillion US dollars in
2013. It also reports that transition economies now represent 9 of the 20 largest investor economies globally.
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China are needed to be explored, given their signicant impact on the world economy.
In this paper, we investigate investment strategies of Chinese MNCs and patterns of Chinas
outward FDI through the lens of domestic input-market distortions, as it has been documented
that discriminations against private rms are a fundamental issue for Chinese economy. For in-
stance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy preferential access to nancing from state-owned
banks, although they are less e¢ cient than private rms (Dollar and Wei, 2007; Song, Storeslet-
ten and Zilibotti, 2011; Khandelwal, Schott and Wei, 2013; Manova et al., 2015). Moreover, Bai,
Krishna and Ma (2013), Bai, Hsieh and Song (2015) and Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013)
document that private rms are treated unequally by the Chinese government in the exporting
market, at least before 2001 when China joined WTO. These unequal treatments come from ex-
cessive (exporting) quotas granted to SOEs and tougher requirements for exporting that private
rms face. In addition, according to a report from the World Bank, SOEs also have priority in
market for land acquisition and are less constrained by environmental regulations. In short, it
is natural to link the behavior of Chinese MNCs to domestic distortions in China.
To our best knowledge, there is no existing work studying how home institutional distortion
a¤ects patterns of outward FDI in the literature. The reason is that developed economies had
been home countries of outward FDI for many decades, and their economies are much less likely
to be subject to distortions compared with developing economies. On the contrary, various dis-
tortions are fundamental features of developing countries. For instance, size-dependent policies
and red tapes have been shown to generate substantial impact on rm growth and resource al-
location in India (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009 and 2012; Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen, 2013).
State-controlled rms in Russia and SOEs in China are more favored than individual and private
rms (Huang , 2003 and 2008; Brandt, Tombe and Zhu, 2013) in their domestic markets. Brazils
economy is plagued with problems of di¢ cult business registration, ine¢ cient judicial systems
and rigid labor markets.3 Moreover, there is already anecdotal evidence documenting how rms
3Doing business index for Brazil can be found at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/
brazil. As the index shows, Brazil is ranked extremely low in terms of starting businesses, dealing with con-
struction permits and enforcing contracts.
2
circumvent these distortions by investing abroad. For instance, the key to the success of Hainan
airline (the fourth largest airline in China and a private rm) is to expand internationally and
acquire foreign assets even at the early stage of its development.4 In total, distortions in the
domestic market do seem to impact rmsdecisions on going aborad in developing countries.
We rst document three sets of stylized facts to motivate our theory. First, although non-
exporting private rms are more productive than non-exporting SOEs on average, private FDI
rms are actually less productive than state-owned FDI rms on average. Second, compared
with private rms, the fraction of rms that undertake outward FDI is smaller among SOEs.
Finally, relative size of FDI rms (i.e., average size of FDI rms divided by average size of
non-exporting rms) is smaller among private rms than among SOEs. All these ndings seem
to be counter-intuitive. First, SOEs are much bigger than private rms, and bigger rms are
more likely to invest abroad. Furthermore, it has been documented that they receive substantial
support from the Chinese government for investing abroad. Thus, why are there so few of them
which actually invested aborad in the data? Second, it has been documented that SOEs are
less productive than private rms in China (e.g., Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012),
Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013)). Our data also shows that this pattern holds when we
look at non-exporting and exporting (but non-FDI) rms. Why does this pattern is reversed
when we focus on FDI rms? Third, if SOEs were more likely to invest abroad, relative size
premium of them should be smaller than that of private rms, since the selection into FDI is
less stringent for SOEs. However, why does the data present the opposite pattern? In short, a
theory is needed to rationalize these ndings.
In order to rationalize the above puzzling ndings, we set up a model in order to highlight two
4 In China, commercial aviation industry had been heavily regulated for many years. As a re-
sult, private rms could not enter this market, although SOEs could. In order to circumvent this
distortion, Hainan airline undertook FDI and served the international market rst. Interesting, af-
ter the airline grew big enough and had the strength to compete against state-owned airlines (e.g.,
Air China), it went back to expand in the domestic market substantially. Readers who are inter-
ested in studying anecdotal evidence of this can nd it at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
for-hainan-airlines-chen-feng-rise-of-resort-in-china-provides-lift-for-a-new-sky-empire/2014/
05/22/d4bb7508-d9fb-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html.
3
economic forces generated by the existence of distortions: institutional arbitrage and selection
reversal. We assume that private rms are discriminated either in the input factor market at
home.5 As a result, there are relative higher incentives for them to invest abroad, since they
can circumvent domestic institutional distortions by doing this, which is termed as institutional
arbitrage in the paper. Institutional arbitrage explains the rst stylized pattern documented
above. Second, absent domestic distortion, there should be no di¤erence in selection into the
FDI market, since both SOEs and private rms face the same foreign market environment when
undertaking FDI. Under the existence of domestic distortions, selection in the domestic market
is tougher from private rms. However, since they receive extra benet from investing abroad
(i.e., alleviation of distortion), they have higher incentives to undertake FDI, which leads to
less tougher selection into FDI. We call this selection reversal. This reversal rationalizes why
private FDI rms are less productive than state-owned FDI rms and why relative size premium
of FDI rms is smaller among private rms than among SOEs. In summary, a model with
the existence of distortion in the domestic market naturally rationalizes all the above puzzling
empirical ndings.
Our model follows Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)s (henceforth, HMY (2004)) industry
equilibrium model with heterogeneous lms. The key feature is that when private rms produce
in the domestic market, they su¤er from higher input prices compared with SOEs. However,
when they undertake FDI and produce abroad, this distortion ceases to exist. As a result,
private rms have one extra benet of undertaking FDI. That is, they can alleviate distortion
they su¤er from the domestic market.6 Therefore, compared with SOEs, private rms are more
likely to undertake FDI, and they have disproportionately more FDI rms compared with SOEs.
Following this line, the model yields two more empirical predictions. First, when private rms
undertake FDI, they produce and sell disproportionately more in the foreign market. We call
5Our models main predictions still hold well when extending our analysis to the distortions in output market,
which can be found from Appendix B.
6This is not true for exporting, since exporting rms are still plagued with distortion in the domestic factor
market.
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this global reallocation of market shares, which is due to the asymmetry of distortions across
borders. Second, conditional on other rm-level characteristics, (overall) rm size of private
rm grow more than that of SOEs when both of them undertake FDI. This is again due to
the existence of the extra benet obtained from investing abroad for private rms. In the end,
we implement further empirical analysis to show that all our theoreticaal predictions receive
support from Chinese rm-level data.
Although we focus on how a particular type of institutional distortion a¤ects economic
outcomes, the insights of this paper are general. For instance, it was reported that a rising
number of talented and wealthy French people went aborad due to the increasing tax rates
in France.7 This serves as a perfect example for institutional arbitrage which is the key idea
of the current paper. Furthermore, tax-evasion motives for the location choice of MNCs is
another example of institutional arbitrage and has found many real world examples.8 Finally,
in India, red tapes have forced many talented entrepreneurs to move out of India and start their
businesses aborad.9 In total, agents, rms and entrepreneurs can move across countries and
regions to circumvent distortions they face. This key idea of this paper is not conned to the
case of discriminations against private rms in China.
This article aims to speak to the literature on FDI and MNCs. For the research on vertical
FDI, Helpman (1984) insightfully points out how the di¤erence in factor prices across countries
a¤ects patterns of vertical FDI. Antràs (2003, 2005) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) emphasize
the importance of contractual frictions for shaping the pattern of FDI and outsourcing in various
industries (e.g., capital-intensive v.s. labor intensive). For research on vertical FDI, Markusen
(1984) postulates the concentration-proximity tradeo¤ which receives empirical support from
Brainard (1997). More recently, HMY (2004) develop a model of trade and FDI with hetero-
geneous rms. They show that the least productive rms sell in the domestic market only;
7See http://www.france24.com/en/20150808-france-wealthy-flee-high-taxes-les-echos-figures.
8Many American rms moved aborad in order to evade high tax rates in the US. For details, see http:
//www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444230504577615232602107536.
9Readers interested in studying anecdotal evidence of this can nd it at http://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/red-tape-forces-top-indian-entrepreneurs-to-shift-overseas/article7367731.ece.
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rms with medium levels of productivity serve the domestic market and export; and the most
productive rms sell domestically and undertake FDI. Our paper contributes to this literature
by pointing out another motive for rms to do FDI and showing how this a¤ects patterns of
FDI both theoretically and empirically.
This paper is also related to the literature that substantiates the existence of resource misal-
location in developing economies. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)s pioneering work documents that
compared with the U.S., there is substantial misallocation of resources across rms in China
and India. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show how size-dependent taxes can generate quanti-
tatively important impact on aggregate productivity. Following their work, scholars started to
uncover how various types of distortions a¤ect aggregate productivity and welfare. Midrigan and
Xu (2014) and Moll (2012) study aggregate impact nancial frictions on the economy. Guner,
Ventura and Xu (2008) and Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen (2013) explore impact of size-
dependent policies on aggregate productivity and rm size distribution.10 Our work contributes
to this research area by showing a linkage between domestic distortion and rmsbehavior in
the global market. Moreover, we provide direct evidence to support our theoretical results.
The third related strand of the literature is the research on distortions in China and FDI
decisions of Chinese rms. Bai, Hsieh and Song (2015) nd that a key feature of Chinese
economy is crony capitalism meaning that each local government supports businesses related to
itself. Brandt, Tombe and Zhu (2013) substantiate the existence of distortions between private
rms and SOEs in China. Furthermore, they document how misallocation between SOEs and
private rms had changed between 1980s and 2000s. Moreover, distortions related to foreign
transactions also exist in Chinese economy. For instance, Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013)
document that private rms in the textile industry had to obtain licenses in order to export,
while SOEs didnt. Recent work on Chinas outward FDI, such as Huang and Wang (2011),
examines the industrial characteristics and heterogenous motivation of FDI but abstract away
10For a synthesis of work on misallocation and distortion, see Restuccia and Rogerson (2013). Review of
Economic Dynamics published a special issue focusing on aggregate impact of distortions and misallocation in
2013 which can be found at http://www.economicdynamics.org/RED-misallocation.htm.
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the role of rm activity. In echoing this, Kolstad and Wilg (2012) nd that Chinese outward
FDI is attracted to three destinations: countries with lower institutional quality, countries that
are rich in natural resources, and large markets. More recently, using the same dataset, Tian
and Yu (2015) document the sorting pattern of Chinese FDI rms among production FDI and
non-production FDI, but abstract away from the key di¤erence between state-owned FDI rms
and private FDI rms. Compared with the existing work, the key innovation of our work is
to link rms decisions on outward FDI to distortions in the home country, and this linkage
deserves more attention in future research.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
Our rst dataset is Chinese manufacturing rms production data set which comes from annual
surveys of industrial rms (ASIF) complied by the National Bureau of Statistics of China from
2000 to 2008. The dataset includes all SOEs and non-SOEs (i.e., private rms) with annual
sales of RMB ve million (or equivalently, about $830,000) or more. The data set includes more
than 100 variables listed in main accounting sheets such as information on rms number of
employees, capital stock, total sales, and export value. These rms contribute about 95 percent
of Chinas total sales in all manufacturing sectors. This data set is particularly useful for us to
identify rms type of ownership (i.e., SOE or not) and to understand rms key charateristics
such as rm size (which is usually proxyed by log number of employees) and rm TFP. As a key
interest of the paper is to consider how input misallocation between SOEs and non-SOEs a¤ect
rm outward FDI, we need to carefully classify SOEs. As discussed in Yu (2015), by the o¢ cial
denition reported in the China City Statistical Yearbook (2006), SOEs include rms such as
domestic SOEs (code in the rm data set: 110), state-owned joint venture enterprises (141),
and state-owned and collective joint venture enterprises (143) but exclude state-owned limited
corporations (151). Appendix Table 1 also provides summary statistics for the SOEs indicator
which equals one if a rm is a SOE and zero otherwise.
7
We also use two datasets of rm outward FDI in the paper, as discussed carefully in Tian
and Yu (2015). The rst data set is nationwide rm-level outward FDI data from 1980 to 2012
whereas the second one is outward FDI data for rms in Zhejiang province only during 2006-
2008. In terms of time span and regional coverage, the former one has signicant advantage than
the latter one. However, the nationwide dataset su¤ers from a critical drawback that it does
not include information of the investment amount for Chinese multinational rms. However,
the information of FDI ow is available in Zhejiangs FDI data set. Nevertheless, both data sets
provide information of the rst year that a rm engages in outward FDI, the specic modes of
investment (wholesale or production FDI), and investment destination countries.
Following Tian and Yu (2015), we merge the two outward FDI data sets with rm-level
production data set by using rms Chinese name and year. If a rm has an exact Chinese rm
in a particular year in all three data sets, it is considered as an identical rm.
Table 1 reports the FDI in our matched data sets. Row (1) of Table 1 shows the number
of manufacturing rms whereas row (2) shows the number of FDI starting rms by year during
2000-08. Row (3) reports the number of matching FDI manufacturing rms.11 Row (4) reports
number of SOEs within the FDI manufacturing rms. Finally, row (5) reports FDI share by
dividing the number of FDI starting rms shown in Row (2) by number of manufacturing rms
in Row (1). Clearly, FDI indeed is a rare event the share is less than 1 percent each year. The
number of FDI manufacturing rms increased quickly after 2004. Finally, the last row exhibits
the share of SOE within FDI rms which is obtained by dividing number in row (4) by that in
row (3), suggesting that share of state-owned multinational rms is small over year.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
We rst estimate and calculate rm TFP using the augmented Olley-Pakes (1996) approach
as in Yu (2015). As processing exporting rms may use di¤erent techonology than non-processing
11Note that we merge FDI data and manufacturing production data by rm name rather than by name-year.
Number of FDI manufacturing rms in row (3) reports not only FDI starting rms, but also FDI continuing rms.
Thus, it is possible that there are fewer FDI starters than matched FDI manufacturing rms, as shown in 2007
and 2008.
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exporting rms (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005) and processing trade accounts for accound a half
of Chinas foreign trade, we estimate the production for exporting and non-exporting rm sepa-
rately in each industry. As suggested by Arkolakis (2010), rm productivity cannot be compared
across industries, we hence normalize the Olley-Pakes TFP in the range between zero and one
by each 2-digit Chinese-industrial-classcation industry to obtain rms relative TFP, which will
be used in ther rest of the paper.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
3.1 Data
We use three main rm-level data sets to conduct our empirical analysis. Our rst dataset is
Chinese manufacturing rms production dataset which comes from annual surveys of industrial
rms (ASIF) complied by the National Bureau of Statistics of China from 2000 to 2008. The
dataset includes all SOEs and non-SOEs (i.e., private rms) with annual sales of RMB ve
million (or equivalently, about $830,000) or more. The dataset includes more than 100 variables
listed in main accounting sheets such as information on rms number of employees, capital
stock, total sales, and export value. These rms contribute about 95 percent of Chinas total
sales in all manufacturing sectors. This dataset is particularly useful for us to identify rms
type of ownership (i.e., SOE or private rms) and to understand rms key characteristics such
as rm size (usually proxyed by log number of employees) and rm TFP.
As a key interest of the paper is to consider how input misallocation between SOEs and non-
SOEs a¤ect rm outward FDI, we need to carefully classify SOEs. As discussed in Yu (2015), by
the o¢ cial denition reported in the China City Statistical Yearbook (2006), SOEs include rms
such as domestic SOEs (code in the rm data set: 110), state-owned joint venture enterprises
(141), and state-owned and collective joint venture enterprises (143) but exclude state-owned
limited corporations (151). Appendix Table 1 also provides summary statistics for the SOEs
indicator which equals one if a rm is a SOE and zero otherwise.
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We also use two datasets of rm outward FDI in the paper, as discussed carefully in Tian
and Yu (2015). The rst dataset is nationwide rm-level outward FDI data from 1980 to 2012
whereas the second one is outward FDI data for rms in Zhejiang province only during 2006-
2008. In terms of time span and regional coverage, the former one has signicant advantage than
the latter one. However, the nationwide dataset su¤ers from a critical drawback that it does
not include information of the investment amount for Chinese multinational rms. However,
the information of FDI ow is available in Zhejiangs FDI dataset. Nevertheless, both datasets
provide information on the rst year that a rm engages in outward FDI, the specic modes of
investment (wholesale or production FDI), and investment destination countries.
Following Tian and Yu (2015), we merge the two outward FDI datasets with rm-level
production dataset by using rms Chinese name and year. If three observations (in three
datasets) have exactly the same Chinese name, it is considered as an identical rm.12
Table 1 reports the FDI in our matched datasets. Row (1) of Table 1 shows the number
of manufacturing rms, whereas row (2) presents the number of FDI starting rms by year
for 2000-2008. Row (3) reports the number of FDI manufacturing rms being match between
datesets.13 Row (4) reports the number of SOEs among FDI manufacturing rms, and Row
(5) calculates the FDI share by taking the ratio of the number in Row (2) to that in Row (1).
Clearly, FDI is a rare event the share is less than 1 percent each year, although the number of
FDI manufacturing rms has increased quickly after 2004. Finally, the last row reports the share
of SOEs among FDI rms (obtained by dividing the number in Row (4) by that in Row (3)),
suggesting that share of state-owned multinational rms is small over year. Appendix Table 1
also provides summary statistics for some key variables.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
12Appendix A provides the detailed procedures of merging the three data sets.
13Note that we merge FDI data and manufacturing production data by rm name rather than by name-year.
Number of FDI manufacturing rms in row (3) reports not only FDI starting rms, but also FDI continuing rms.
Thus, it is possible that there are fewer FDI starters than matched FDI manufacturing rms, as shown in 2007
and 2008.
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We rst estimate and calculate rm TFP using the augmented Olley-Pakes (1996) approach
as in Yu (2015). As processing exporting rms may use di¤erent technology than non-processing
exporting rms (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005) and processing trade accounts for around a half of
Chinas foreign trade, we estimate the production for exporting and non-exporting rm sepa-
rately in each industry. As suggested by Arkolakis (2010), rm productivity cannot be compared
across industries, we hence normalize the Olley-Pakes TFP in the range between zero and one
by each 2-digit Chinese-industrial-classication industry to obtain rms relative TFP, which
will be used for the rest of the paper.
3.2 Stylized Facts
The main purpose of this subsection is to document three stylized facts using Chinese data on
MNCs. As our interest is to explore how domestic resource misallocation a¤ects rms outward
FDI behavior, we start to ask which type of rms, SOEs or private rms, is more productive if
they only serve the domestic market.
Stylized Fact One: Productivity Premium for State-Owned MNCs
Table 2 compares the di¤erences in rm productivity between SOEs and private rms. The
simple t-test in Column (1) clearly suggests that private rms are more productive than SOEs
for non-FDI rms. Admittedly, a simple t-test comparison is insu¢ cient to conclude that private
non-FDI rms are more productive, as SOEs are usually larger and have more sales than private
rms. We thus perform the nearest-matching propensity score matching (PSM) by choosing
rm sales and the number of rm employees as covariates.14 Column (2) shows the estimates
for average treatment for the treated (ATT) for private rms. Again, the coe¢ cient of the
productivity di¤erence between SOEs and private rms is highly signicant, suggesting that
SOEs are less productive than private rms. We then compare TFP di¤erence between SOEs and
private rms that either serve the domestic market (only) or sell domestically and export. Both
14To avoid the case that an observation has identical propensity score value, we perform a random sorting
before matching.
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the simple t-test comparison reported in column (3) and PSM-matching comparison reported
in column (4) suggest that private rms are, overall, more productive than SOEs. In total, our
above ndings for non-FDI rms are consistent with other studies such as Hsieh and Klenow
(2009).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
On the contrary, when focusing on FDI rms, we nd a phenomenon of selection reversal.
That is, private MNCs (i.e., Chinese private parent rms) are on average less productive than
state-owned MNCs (i.e., state-owned parent rms), which is shown by column (5) of Table 2. To
check the robustness of this nding, we focus on the productivity di¤erence between private and
state-owned MNCs that are engaged in both FDI and exporting as well.15 Column (6) reveals
the same pattern as before. Namely, private FDI rms are less productive than state-owned
FDI rms in China.
Stylized Fact Two: Smaller Fraction of State-Owned MNCs
We state our second stylized fact now. Column (9) of Table 2 reports that the fraction of
FDI rms is bigger among private rms than among SOEs. On the one hand, this nding is
puzzling, since SOEs are bigger rms (compared with private rms) which should be more likely
to invest abroad. Furthermore, the Chinese government supports its SOEs investing abroad
for many years, known as the Going Out strategy. On the other hand, such an observation
echoes with our rst nding: as state-owned FDI rms are more productive than private FDI
rms, the fraction of SOEs engaged in doing FDI should be larger.
Stylized Fact Three: Bigger Size Premium for State-Owned MNCs
Finally, we document our last stylized fact. we rst see the absolute preium of state-owned
MNCs. Columns (3) to (6) of Table 4 show that private FDI rms (i.e., parent rms) are smaller
15 If foreign countries impose high tari¤s on Chinese products, some FDI parent rms may set up foreign a¢ liates
in order to substitute for exporting. In reality, some Chinese MNCs engage in both outward FDI and exporting,
especially for those rms that undertake distribution FDI (Tian and Yu, 2015).
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than state-owned FDI rm (i.e., parent rms) in terms of employment and sales. Columns (1)
and (2) of the top module in Table 3 show that, among non-FDI exporting rms, private rms are
smaller than SOEs. Their di¤erence is statistically signicant. Regarding FDI Chinese parent
rms, we examine two groups respectively: (i) FDI non-exporting rms which are engaged in
outward investment but not exporting (as shown in columns (3) and (4)); (ii) FDI rms with
both outward investment and exporting (as shown in columns (5) and (6)). Di¤erent from the
case of productivity comparison, we see that, both types of private FDI rms are smaller than
the state-owned FDI rms.16 In short, SOEs are bigger than private rms irrespective of their
FDI and exporting status.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
More importantly, size premium for state-owned MNCs holds in the relative sense as well.
Specically, Table 4 shows that the ratio of average log employment of (the domestic part of)
MNCs to that of non-exporting rms is bigger among SOEs than among private rms.17 To sum
up, our third stylized fact states that both absolute and relative (compared with non-exporting
rms) size of private MNCs are smaller than state-owned MNCs.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Thus far, we have established three interesting empirical ndings. First, we observe produc-
tivity premium for state-owned MNCs in the sense that private MNCs are less productive than
state-owned FDI rms, although private non-FDI rms are more productive than state-owned
16The bottom module of Appendix Table 2 examines the size di¤erence by year for such two type of rms. Still,
state-owned FDI rms are larger than private FDI rms each year. Finally, the last column of Table 3 shows that
domestic sales of private FDI rms is also smaller than that of state-owned FDI rms.
17The rst module of Table 5 reports the comparison of the relative size of FDI rms to non-exporting rms
between private rms and SOEs. The relative size is measured by ljo=l
j
d where l
j
o and l
j
d represents log employment
of FDI rms and log employment of non-exporting rms for rm type j (i.e., private or state-owned). The year-
average ratio in rst column shows that the relative size of private rms is signicantly smaller than that of SOEs.
As few SOEs were engaged in outward FDI before 2004 (see Table 1), we report the year-average ratio up to a
particular year for the rest part of Table 4. All columns suggest a relative size premium for state-owned MNCs,
and the di¤erence in the relative size (between private rms and SOEs) is more pronounced after 2004.
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non-FDI rms. Second, we nd that a smaller proportion of SOEs to undertake FDI, despite
that they are much bigger than private rms. Finally, we document that both the absolute and
relative size of state-owned FDI rms are bigger than private FDI rms. We call this size pre-
mium for state-owned FDI rms. In what follows, we construct a theoretical model to rationalize
all these ndings.
4 Model
In the theoretical part of the paper, we modify the standard FDI model proposed by HMY (2004)
to rationalize the empirical ndings documented above. We study how discrimination against
private rms in input-factor markets a¤ects the sorting pattern of MNCs and size-premium of
them. At the same time, we also investigate how di¤erence in foreign investment cost impacts
investment behavior of private MNCs and state-owned MNCs di¤erently.
4.1 Setup
There is one industry populated by rms that produce di¤erentiated products under conditions
of monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each variety is indexed by !, and

 is the set of all varieties. Consumers derive utility from consuming these di¤erentiated goods
according to
U =
h Z
!2

q(!)
 1
 d!
i 
 1
; (1)
where q(!) is the consumption of variety !, and  is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between di¤erentiated goods.
Entrepreneurs can enter the industry by paying a xed cost, fe. After paying the entry cost,
the entrepreneur receives a random draw of (labor) productivity, ', for her rm. The cumulative
density function (CDF) of this draw is assumed to be F ('). Once the entrepreneur observes the
productivity draw, she decides whether or not to stay in the market as there is a xed cost to
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produce, fD, as well. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs in the monopolistically competitive sector
earn an expected payo¤ that is equal to zero due to free entry.
Labor is the only factor that is used in production. A productivity draw of ' means that the
rm needs to use h(q)=' units of labor to produce h(q) unit of output, where h(q) is a convex
function of output which will be specied soon. Since there are only two asymmetric countries
in the model, we use wH and wF to denote the equilibrium wage level in the home country and
in the foreign country respectively.
After entering and choosing to stay in the domestic market, each entrepreneur also chooses
whether to serve in the foreign market (or equivalently, the rest of the world). There are two
ways to serve the foreign market, the rst of which is through exporting. Exporting entails a
variable trade cost, ( 1), and a xed exporting cost, fX . The second way is to set up a plant
in the foreign country and produce there directly. The cost of doing this is a xed cost denoted
by fI .18 In short, we consider horizontal FDI here as in HMY (2004).
The key innovation of the model is to introduce a wedge between the input price paid by
SOEs and by private enterprises when they prod, beared by the private rm is c(> 1) times as
high as that by the SOE.19
Based on equation (1), we derive the demand function for variety ! as
q(!) =
p(!) 
P 1 H
E; (2)
18Qualitative results of the model would be the same, if we assumed that private rms pay higher xed produc-
tion cost (and xed exporting cost), but not higher xed cost of undertaking outward FDI. Higher xed production
cost and exporting cost lead to tougher selection in the domestic market and in the exporting market for private
rms. This is exactly the impact of discrimination against private rms generated by our model. Furthermore,
since the xed FDI cost is not higher for private rms, these rms have higher incentives to set up plants abroad
and produce there. This is another key result of our model. Some evidence shows that the xed FDI cost is
actually higher for Chinese SOEs sometime (i.e., the banning of Chinese SOEsentering the US market). Finally,
it may be argued that the xed entry cost, fe is higher for private rms. However, this argument does not seem
to square well with the data. A higher entry cost implies a lower exit cuto¤ and lower average productivity for
private rms (compared with SOEs) due to free entry, which is against the nding form the data.
19Alternatively, we can also assume the existence of this wedge in the product market. For this scenario,
di¤erence in revenue taxes is a straightforward example. An extreme case of this type of discrimination is to ban
the entry of private rms like what had happened in the commercial aviation industry in China. This case can
be treated as a case in which the tax rate on revenue is one hundred percent for private rms. The analysis is
relegated to Appendix B.
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where E is the total income of the economy and P is the idea price index of the di¤erentiated
goods and dened as P 
hR

(!)2
 p
1 (!)MdF (!)
i 1
1 
where M is the total mass of varieties
in equilibrium. The resulting revenue function is
q
 1
 E
1
P  ; (3)
where    1 . To simplify the notation, we dene the aggregate market condition as Ci 
E
1

i P

i , 8i 2 fH;Fg, where H and F represent Home and Foreign market respectively.
The cost function features decreasing returns to scale and is country-specic. Specically,
for an SOE that does not undertake FDI, its cost function is
(qH + IfqE>0gqE)
2wH
2'
; (4)
where wH is the wage paid to workers in the domestic market. IfqE > 0g is an indication
function which takes the value of one, if the rm exports and vice versa. qH and qF are domestic
sales and exports respectively. If an SOE does domestic production and FDI, the total cost is a
sum of two parts:
q2HwH
2'
+
q2FwF
2'
; (5)
where wF is the wage paid to workers in the foreign market, and qF is the output produced
by the foreign a¢ liate. The cost function of private rms is almost same as the SOEscost
function except that the factor price the private rm pays is cwH when it produces in the
domestic market. For instance, if a private rm does domestic production and FDI, the total
cost is
cq2HwH
2'
+
q2FwF
2'
: (6)
The key here is that the foreign a¢ liate of a private MNE pays a lower factor price than its
headquarters at home.
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4.2 Domestic Production, Exporting and FDI
In this subsection, we consider the choice between three types of production modes: domestic
production, exporting and FDI. We derive the operating prot (inclusive of the xed costs) and
the nal prot of an SOE that sells only domestically as20
SD(') =
h
1  
2
i '
wH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H (7)
and
SD(') =
h
1  
2
i '
wH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H   fD: (8)
For a private rm that sells only domestically, the respective prot functions are
PD(') =
h
1  
2
i '
cwH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H (9)
and
PD(') =
h
1  
2
i '
cwH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H   fD: (10)
The exporting decision involves the allocation of output in the domestic market and the
foreign market. First, for a rm that sells both domestically and internationally, the optimal
output allocation is the solution to
max
qE ;qH
qE

 1

CF + q
 1

H CH ;
given that
qE + qH  q;
20 In this section, subscript S and P denote SOEs and private rms. Subscript D, X and O represent domestic
production only, domestic production and exporting, and domestic production and outward FDI.
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where q is the total output produced. Thus, the optimal share of output sold domestically is
s(CH ; CF ) =
CH
CH + C

F =
 1 ; (11)
which applies to both the SOE and the private rm. Based on equation (11), we obtain the
operating prot and the nal prot for an SOE that sells in the two markets as
SX(') =
h
1  
2
i '
wH
 1
+1

CH +
CF
 ( 1)
 2
+1
(12)
and
SX(') =
h
1  
2
i '
wH
 1
+1

CH +
CF
 ( 1)
 2
+1   fD   fX ; (13)
where fX is the xed cost of exporting. For a private rm that sells in both markets, the
operating prot and nal prot are
PX(') =
h
1  
2
i '
cwH
 1
+1

CH +
CF
 ( 1)
 2
+1
(14)
and
FPX(') =
h
1  
2
i '
cwH
 1
+1

CH +
CF
 ( 1)
 2
+1   fD   fX (15)
respectively. Note that exporting is subject to the same factor price di¤erential, c.
The operating prot and nal prot of SOEs and private rms that sell domestically and
undertake FDI are derived as follows:
SO(') =
h
1  
2
i" '
wH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H +
'
wF
 1
+1
C
2
+1
F
#
; (16)
SO(') =
h
1  
2
i" '
wH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H +
'
wF
 1
+1
C
2
+1
F
#
  fD   fI ; (17)
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PO(') =
h
1  
2
i" '
cwH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H +
'
wF
 1
+1
C
2
+1
F
#
; (18)
PO(') =
h
1  
2
i" '
cwH
 1
+1
C
2
+1
H +
'
wF
 1
+1
C
2
+1
F
#
  fD   fI : (19)
4.3 Sorting Pattern of FDI rms and Size-Premium of MNCs
In this subsection, we derive relationship between various cuto¤s and explore how average rm
size of FDI rms di¤ers across SOEs and private rms. First, equations (7) and (9) show that
'PD = c'SD > 'SD;
which implies that it is tougher for private rms to survive in the domestic market. Second, the
relationship between the exporting cuto¤ and the exit cuto¤ is the same across the two types of
rms and derived as:
'PX
'PD
=
'SX
'SD
=
"
fX=fD
CH+C

F =
( 1)
CH
 2
+1   1
#+1
 1
: (20)
As usual, we assume that the xed cost of exporting is high enough such that there is selection
of exporting. Third, for an SOE that serves the foreign market, it chooses FDI over exporting
if and only if
fD
 'SO
'SD
 ( 1)
+1
 
1 + (wH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1  
CH + CF = ( 1)
CH
 2
+1
!
> fI   fX :
Thus, the cuto¤ for doing FDI can be expressed as
'SO
'SD
=

(fI   fX)=fD
+1
 1
 
1 + (wH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1  
CH + CF = ( 1)
CH
 2
+1
! (+1)
 1
:
(21)
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A similar relationship applies to private rms:
'PO
'PD
=

(fI   fX)=fD
+1
 1
 
1 + (cwH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1  
CH + CF = ( 1)
CH
 2
+1
! (+1)
 1
:
(22)
There are two points worth mentioning before proceeding. First, we assume that there is selection
of multinational rms among rms that want to sell goods aborad. This is true if fI is su¢ ciently
large. Second, the variable trade cost,  , is assumed to be large enough such that there are FDI
rms in equilibrium.21
We use the following propositions to summarize how the likelihood of becoming an FDI rm,
the fraction of FDI rms, and the average productivity of FDI rms di¤er across private rms
and SOEs.
Proposition 1 Sorting pattern of private rms and and SOEs:
1. The exit cuto¤ and the exporting cuto¤ are higher for private rms than for SOEs. How-
ever, the cuto¤ for becoming an MNE is lower for private rms than for SOEs (i.e.,
selection reversal).
2. Assume that the initial productivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution (for private
rms and SOEs) except that the minimum productivity level can di¤er across the two types
of rms. Then, the fraction of MNCs is bigger among private rms than among SOEs.
In addition, the average productivity of private FDI (or non-exporting) rms is smaller
(or bigger) than that of state-owned FDI rms (i.e., productivity premium for state-owned
FDI rms).
3. Conditional on productivity (i.e., the initial draw), private rms are more likely to become
FDI rm.
21 In the case with two symmetric countries, there would be no multinational SOEs if  = 1 and fI > fD.
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Proof. First, we have already shown that the exit cuto¤ is higher for private rms:
'PD = c'SD > 'SD:
Second, from equations (20) to (22), we know that
'PX
'PD
=
'SX
'SD
;
'PO
'PD
<
'SO
'SD
:
Therefore, the exporting cuto¤ is higher for private rms as well. Third, from equations (21)
and (22), we derive that
'PO
'SO
= (A0  A1)
+1
 1
c
c
 1
+1A0  A1
+1 1 ;
where
A0 
wH
wF
 1
+1
CF
CH
 2
+1
;A1 
CH + CF = ( 1)
CH
 2
+1   1 > 0:
Note that c
c
 1
+1A0 A1
+1 1 monotonically decrease in c as A0  A1 > 0 and c > 1.22 Thus, the
(strict) upper bound for 'PO'SO is one. Therefore, 'PO < 'SO; which implies that conditioning on
the productivity draw, private rms are more likely to become FDI rms.
Fourth, suppose the productivity draw follows a Pareto distribution with the same shape
parameter for SOEs and private rms. The result that
'PO < 'SO 'PD > 'SD
implies that
'PD
'PO
>
'SD
'SO
;
22otherwise there would be no outward FDI rms in equilibrium.
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which leads to the result that the fraction of MNCs is bigger among private enterprises than
among SOEs. Next, since 'PO < 'SO, and the productivity draw follows the Pareto distribution
with the same shape parameter for the two types of rms, average productivity of private FDI
rms is smaller than that of state-owned FDI rms. Finally, since
'PX
'PD
=
'SX
'SD
;
'PX > 'SX , 'PD > 'SD, and the productivity draw follows the Pareto distribution with the
same shape parameter for the two types of rms, average productivity of private non-exporting
rms is bigger than that of state-owned non-exporting rms.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. First, since there is discrimination against
private rms in home country, it is more di¢ cult for private rms to survive and export. As
a result, the exit cuto¤ and exporting cuto¤ are bigger for private rms. However, investing
abroad helps private rms to alleviate distortion. Thus, relative to the exit cuto¤, the FDI
cuto¤ is actually smaller for private rms. Moreover, setting up a plant abroad and ceasing
to export help the rm overcome diseconomies of scale for domestic production. This benet
is disproportionately higher for private rms, since they face a higher input price at home.
Therefore, the absolute value of the FDI cuto¤ is also smaller for private rms than for SOEs.
The above theoretical results rationalize the rst two empirical ndings documented in last
section. As Table 5 will show, compared with private rms, SOEs are less likely to undertake
FDI. As Table 2 reports, the fraction of FDI rms is smaller among SOEs. Moreover, Tabe 2
shows that although non-exporting private rms are more productive than non-exporting SOEs
on average, private FDI rms are actually less productive than state-owned FDI rms on average.
We use the next proposition to show how average rm size di¤ers across private rms and
SOEs.
Proposition 2 Absolute Size Premium for SOEs: Suppose the initial productivity draw
follows the same Pareto distribution (for private rms and SOEs) except that the minimum
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productivity level can di¤er across these two types of rms.
1. Average overall rm size (i.e., sales and employment) of exporting (and multinational)
private rms is smaller than that of exporting (and multinational) SOEs.
2. Average domestic sales and employment of FDI rms (i.e., rm size of the domestic part
of an FDI rm) are also smaller for private rms than for SOEs.
Proof. First, since ' follows the same Pareto distribution, we only need to compare rm
size of the marginal SOE and the marginal private rm in order to show the di¤erence in average
rm size. For the marginal SOE that has the draw of 'SO and the marginal private rm that
has the draw of 'PO, rm-level sales are
S('SO) = S('SD)
fI   fX
fD
1 + (wH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1
1 + (wH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1  

CH+C

F =
( 1)
CH
 2
+1
and
S('PO) = S('PD)
fI   fX
fD
1 + (cwH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1
1 + (cwH=wF )
 1
+1 (CF =CH)
2
+1  

CH+C

F =
( 1)
CH
 2
+1
:
Since S('SD) = S('PD) =
fD
(1 =2) and c > 1, we must have
S('SO) > S('PO):
Therefore, average sales of multinational private rms is smaller than that of multinational
SOEs.
Second, since the cuto¤ for becoming FDI rms is smaller for private rms, and private rms
pay higher input price when they produce at home, average domestic sales of private FDI rms
is also smaller than that of state-owned FDI rms.
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Next, since 'PX'PD =
'SX
'SD
and S('SD) = S('PD), the marginal exporting SOE and the
marginal exporting private rm have the same sales. Moreover, since 'PO'PD <
'SO
'SD
and the
productivity draw follows the Pareto distribution with the same parameter, average rm size of
exporting private rms is smaller than that of exporting SOEs.
Finally, for all rms, 2 fraction of revenue is paid to inputs, and the input price private
rms pay is higher than what SOEs pay. Therefore, average employment or capital stock (i.e.,
depending on which input the rm uses) of private FDI rms is also smaller than that of state-
owned FDI rms. Moreover, the di¤erence in average employment between private FDI rms
and state-owned FDI rms is even bigger than the di¤erence in average sales, since private rms
pay higher input price which reduces their demand for inputs, even conditioning on sales.
The above results receive signicant statistical support from Table 3, since average rm size
(i.e., log sales and employment) of private exporting and FDI rms is much smaller than that of
state-owned exporting and FDI rms. This is expecially the case when we focus on the domestic
sales of FDI rms as well.
Finally, we use the next proposition to show how rm size premium of exporters and FDI
rms di¤er across private rms and SOEs.
Proposition 3 Relative Size Premium for State-owned MNCs: Suppose the initial pro-
ductivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution (for private rms and SOEs) except that the
minimum productivity level can di¤er across these two types of rms.
1. Relative domestic employment of private exporting rms (i.e., compared with private non-
exporting rms) is smaller than that of state-owned exporting rms.
2. Relative domestic employment of private multinational rms (i.e., compared with private
non-exporting rms) is also smaller than that of state-owned multinational rms as well.
Proof. The key observation is that average sales of non-exporting SOEs equals average sales
of non-exporting private rms. To see this, rst note that the marginal SOE (i.e., on the exit
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cuto¤) and the marginal private rm have the same level of sales:
S('SD) = S('PD) =
fD
(1  =2) :
Furthermore, since the draw of ' follows the Pareto distribution, and
'PX
'PD
=
'SX
'SD
;
average sales of non-exporting SOEs equals average sales of non-exporting private rms. As
average sales of exporting SOEs is higher, the ratio of average sales of exporters to that of
non-exporters is higher for SOEs than for private rms. Furthermore, among private rms or
SOEs, exporting and non-exporting rms pay the same factor price and have the same share of
revenue that is paid to employees. Therefore, the ratio of average employment of exporters to
that of non-exporters is also higher for SOEs than for private rms.
Next, we discuss how the size premium for FDI rms across types of ownership. First, as
shown in Proposition 2, average domestic sales of private FDI rms is smaller than that of state-
owned FDI rms. Therefore, the ratio of average sales of FDI rmsdomestic subsidiaries to that
of non-exporting rms is higher for SOEs than for private rms. Second, domestic subsidiaries
of private FDI rms face the same factor price as non-exporting private rms. Thus, the
ratio of average employment is the same as the ratio of average sales of domestic subsidiaries of
private FDI rmsto non-exporting private rms. Similarly, domestic subsidiaries of state-owned
FDI rmsface the same factor price as non-exporting SOEs. Therefore, the ratio of average
employment is the same as the ratio of average sales of domestic subsidiaries of state-owned FDI
rmsto non-exporting SOEs. In total, the ratio of average employment is the same as the ratio
of average sales (between FDI rmsdomestic subsidiaries and non-exporters) for both private
rms and SOEs. Therefore, the ratio of average employment of FDI rmsdomestic subsidiaries
to that of non-exporting rms is higher for SOEs than for private rms.
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The above result receives strong statistical support from Table 4. As the table shows, size
premium of private multinational rms is smaller than that of state-owned multinational rms.
In addition, size premium of private exporting rms is also smaller than that of state-owned
exporting rms.
4.4 Investment Cost, Distortion and Allocation of Sales across Borders
The following proposition discusses how FDI rms allocate their products across borders and
how this di¤er across state-owned FDI rms and private FDI rms. Furthermore, it shows how
overall rm size changes when the rm begins to undertake FDI and how it di¤ers across SOEs
and private rms.
Proposition 4 Global Allocation of Sales:
1. The ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales is higher for private FDI rms than for state-
owned FDI rms.
2. Suppose there is a reduction in the xed FDI cost (i.e., fI). Conditional on the productivity
draw of ' and other rm-level characteristics, an increase in overall rm size is larger for
the new multinational private rm than for the new multinational SOE.
3. Suppose we are in a world with two symmetric countries. When distortion deteriorates (i.e,
c increases), the di¤erence in the ratio of relative (domestic) size of state-owned MNCs
(compared with non-exporting rms) to that of private MNCs incraeses.
Proof. First, equations (17) and (19) imply that, conditional on ', the ratio of foreign sales
to domestic sales is higher for private FDI rms than for state-owned FDI rms. The reason
is that there is no distortion in the foreign market. Furthermore, this ratio does not vary with
' within private FDI rms or state-owned FDI rms. Therefore, we have the unconditional
statement that the ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales is higher for private FDI rms than
for state-owned FDI rms.
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For the second part of the proposition, there are three cases to consider. The rst case is
the case in which both rms are non-exporters before the reduction in fI . Equations (7), (9),
(16) and (18) together imply that
PO(')
PD(')
>
SO(')
SD(')
;
which proves the second part of this proposition for the rst case (remember overall sales are
proportional to the operating prot). The next case is the case in which both rms are exporters
before the reduction of fI . In this case, equations (12), (14), (16) and (18) also imply that
PO(')
PX(')
>
SO(')
SX(')
:
Therefore, after the two rms undertake FDI, the increase in overall rm size is bigger for the
new multinational private rm than for the new multinational SOE.
The nal case to consider is the case in which the SOE is an exporter and the private rm
is a non-exporter before the reduction of the xed FDI cost. In this case, we still have
PO(')
PD(')
>
PO(')
PX(')
>
SO(')
SX(')
;
since PX(') > PD('). Therefore, after the two rms undertake FDI, conditioning on ', the
increase in overall rm size is bigger for the new multinational private rm than for the new
multinational SOE as well. In total, the second part of this proposition is true for all possible
cases.
For the third part of the proposition, note that the relative size of private FDI rms is
Ave(empl)PO;dom
Ave(empl)PD;dom
=
Ave(Sales)PO;dom
Ave(Sales)PD;dom
=
 
'PO
'PD
! 1
+1 1
1 

'PD
'PX
k  1
+1
;
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where dom refers to employment and sales for domestic output. Similarly, the relative size of
state-owned FDI rms is
Ave(empl)SO;dom
Ave(empl)SD;dom
=
Ave(Sales)SO;dom
Ave(Sales)SD;dom
=
 
'SO
'SD
! 1
+1 1
1 

'SD
'SX
k  1
+1
:
Note that
'PX
'PD
=
'SX
'SD
;
and this ratio does ont depend on c. Therefore, the ratio of relative (domestic) size of state-owned
FDI rms to that of private FDI rms can be expressed as
Ave(empl)SO;dom=Ave(empl)SD;dom
Ave(empl)PO;dom=Ave(empl)PD;dom
=

'SO
'SD
 1
+1

'PO
'PD
 1
+1
:
Equations 21 and 22 imply that the relative size ratio increases with the distortion parameter,
c, if we are in a world with two symmetric countries. It is straightforward to observe that the
di¤erence in the relative size:
Ave(empl)SO;dom
Ave(empl)SD;dom
  Ave(empl)PO;dom
Ave(empl)PD;dom
increases with c in a world with two symmetric countries. For the case of two asymmetric
countries, it is impossible to prove this result analytically. This is because all equilibrium
variables (i.e., wH , wF , CH , CF ) change, when the distortion changes.
The intuition for the above proposition is straightforward. Since there is an extra benet
for private rms to invest abroad, the increase in overall rm size is bigger for them as well.
When private rms become MNCs, they produce and sell disproportionately more in the foreign
market owing to the non-existence of distortions in that market. This e¤ect (i.e., the global
market share allocation) is another key result of our theoretical framework for which we will
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provide empirical support in next section.
Proposition 4 receives empirical support from Tables 7-9 which will be discussed more care-
fully in the next section. In summary, for the decision on FDI, distortion in factor markets
generates two economic forces that have not been explored much in the literature. First, insti-
tutional arbitrage generates additional incentives for rms that are unfavored in the domestic
market to invest aborad. As a result, there is less tougher selection in the FDI market for this
type of rms. In our story, these unfavored rms are private rms in China. Second, when these
rms undertake FDI, they produce and sell products disproportionately more in the foreign
market due to the non-existence of institutional distortion. These two key insights continue to
hold, if we assume there are distortions in the product market.23
5 Empirical Estimates
Our theoretical model states four propositions. Most of them are exactly consistent with the
stylized facts in Section 2. However, some of them needs further empirical examination. In this
section we thus explore whether or not such theoretical predictions are supported by Chinese
rm-level data.
5.1 FDI decision and rm type of ownership
Proposition 1 has three predictions. Its rst point states that both the exit cuto¤ and exporting
cutting are higher for private rms than for SOEs, suggesting that survival private rms overall
are more productive than SOEs. This is exactly what we observe in the rst stylized fact. The
second prediction of Proposition 1 emphasizes the productive premium for state-owned MNCs.
First, the average productivity of private MNCs (or non-exporting rms) is smaller (or bigger)
than that of state-owned MNCs (or non-exporting rms). Second, the fraction of MNCs is larger
among private rms than among SOEs. These two points have also already conrmed in Table
23 Interested reader are referred to Appendix B for more details.
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2. Finally, Proposition 1 suggests that private rms are more likely to engage in outward FDI.
We now go to empirically test this.
Estimates in Table 5 start from a linear probability model (LPM) in which the regressand is
outward FDI indicator (equal one if a rm engages in FDI and zero otherwise). To see whether
SOEs are less likely to engage in FDI, we include a SOE indicator in the estimates. In addition,
we control for key rm characteristics such rm size (in log number of employees), rm TFP,
and export indicator. As discussed in Tian and Yu (2015), our nationwide FDI data are pooled
cross-section data as we only know the rst year that rms engage in FDI but do not know
the year that rms stop or continue to FDI. Thus estimates in Table 5 and other tables only
includes non-FDI rms and FDI starters. We thus control for year-specic xed e¤ects and
industry-specic xed e¤ects in Column (2). The SOE indicator is negative and signicant,
suggesting that SOEs are less likely to engage in outward FDI. However, the magnitude of the
SOE seems too small. We suspect that this is due to the well-know pitfall of LPM in which its
predicted probability could be great than one or less than zero. To overcome such drawback,
we thus perform probit estimates in Column (3) and logit estimates in Column (4) which still
yield similar qualitatively nding: compared to private rms, SOEs are less likely to engage in
outward FDI.
However, there are two important caveats for the probit (or logit) estimates. First, as
shown in Table 1, there are only less than one percent of rms engage in FDI. Within FDI
rms, only a very small proportion of rms are SOEs. Thus, state-owned MNCs are rare events
which distribution exhibit faster convergence toward the probability that SOEs engage in foreign
investment. However, standard logit or probit estimates are assumed to be symmetric to the
original point. We thus perform the complementary log-log model in column (5) which allows
a faster convergence speed toward the rare events. Second, as highlighted by King and Zeng
(2001, 2002), the standard binary nonlinear models, such as logit or probit, would underestimate
the probability of rare events. To address this concern, they recommend using the rare-event
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logit approach which can corrects for possible underestimation.24 The last column of Table 5
reports the logit estimates with rare-event corrections. The key coe¢ cient of the SOE indicator
is much larger than its counterparts in Columns (4)-(5) in absolute value. Equally importantly,
the coe¢ cient is still negative and signicant, conrming that SOEs are less likely to engage in
outward FDI. This is exactly consistent with the prediction in Proposition 1.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
5.2 Discussions in input market distortions
Our theoretical model is built on the assumption that private rms face discrimination on input
factor markets. Compared to SOEs, private rms have to bear higher input costs in the domestic
market. Although such an assumption seems to be widely accepted, it is still curious whether
it can be validated by Chinese data. We now turn to this job.
Previous works suggest that Chinese SOEs can access to working capital by paying a lower
interest rate (Feenstra et al, 2014). Similarly, SOEs can also acquire land at a lower market
price, which is especially true in the manufacturing sectors (Tian et al., 2015). To see whether
such conjectures are supported by data, we rst construct a measured rm-level interest rate by
dividing rms interest expenses by its current liability in each year, which both can be obtained
from the ASIF data set. We regress measured interest rate over the SOE indicator in Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 6. Our underlying assumption is SOEs can access to external working capital
at a lower cost than private rms. If so, it should be observed that the SOE indicator has a
negative and signicant coe¢ cient.
This outcome is exactly what we observe in Table 6. The estimates in Column (1) abstract
away other control variables whereas those in Column (2) include both year-specic and industry-
specic xed e¤ects. In addition to various xed e¤ects, Column (3) also control for other key
24Note that the rare-events estimation bias can be corrected as follows. We rst estimate the nite sample bias
of the coe¢ cients, bias(^), to obtain the bias-corrected estimates ^ bias(^), where ^ denotes the coe¢ cients
obtained from the conventional logistic estimates.
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rm-characteristics such as rm TFP and rm size (proxied by log rm labor). It turns out that
the key coe¢ cient, the SOE indicator, is always negative and signicant, suggesting that SOEs
pay less interest rate and hence bear lower capital costs than private rms.
Columns (4)-(6) turn to check whether or not SOEs acquire land input at a lower cost.
However, an empirical challenge is that data on each rms land price are unavailable. Instead,
we are only able to access the price of land sale (conversion) at the prefectural city level by year.25
We thus construct a variable of SOE intensity which is dened as the number of SOEs divided
by the number of total manufacturing rms within each prefectural city. If our hypothesis is
supported by data, a city with a higher proportion of SOEs is expected to have a lower price.
The estimates in Columns (4)-(6) thus regress city-average land price on the SOE intensity.26
We expect a negative coe¢ cient of the SOE intensity. In particular, Column (4) only controls
for year-specic xed e¤ects whereas Column (5) controls for both year-specic and industry-
specic xed e¤ects. It is possible that the aggregate demand for land acquisition in each city
could a¤ect citys land price, Column (6) thus also controls for cities total sales as well as
city-specic, year-specic and industry-specic xed e¤ects. In any case, the coe¢ cients of SOE
intensity in all estimates are negative and statistically signicant, suggesting that, on average,
SOEs pay less land price and hence bear lower land costs than private rms.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
5.3 Firm size and host investment liberalization
We now turn to test Proposition 4. The rst prediction of Proposition 4 states that the ratio of
foreign sales to domestic sales is higher for private MNCs than for state-owned MNCs. However,
we are not able to directly test this theoretical prediction as we are not able to access to data on
25Data are from Chinas Land and Resources Statistical Yearbook (various years). As in Tian et al. (2015), we
only use data on land sales that are sold or granted by market channels including agreement, auction, bidding,
and listing. We exclude land transfer to SOEs through direct government leasing and allocation. Thus, our
coe¢ cients in the estimates of Table 6 shall be understood as the lower bound of the measured distortion.
26Note that cities with zero SOEs or all SOEs are dropped from the sample.
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the sales of Chinese a¢ liates. To detour such data challenge, we proxy foreign sales and domestic
sales with foreign investment volume and parent rms total capital stock respectively.27 Column
(1) of Table 7 regresses such an investment ratio on the SOE indicator. It turns out that the SOE
indicator has a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient, which is exactly consistent with
our prediction that foreign sales ratio is lower for state-owned MNCs than for private MNCs.
Column (2) includes rm TFP and days of import document preparation which is a proxy of
rms exporting xed costs.28 In addition, Column (3) even controls for both year-specic xed
e¤ects and industry-specic xed e¤ects. In both experiments, the SOE indicator is still negative
and signicant. Thus, our estimation results are robust. As the nationwide FDI data set does
not provide information on FDI volume, we instead use Zhejiangs FDI sample during 2006-2008
to run regressions. Accordingly, the number of observations decrease a lot in all estimations.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Furthermore, the second prediction in Proposition 4 stresses that, in response to investment
liberalization in the hosting countries, the increase in overall rm size is larger for new private
MNCs than for the new state-owned MNCs. Several points in Table 8 merit special attention.
First, since rm size is usually measured by rm sales and log number of employees, Table 8 tests
such a prediction using these two variables. Second, as data on the sales of foreign a¢ liates are
unavailable, we replace rm sales with capital stocks for both domestic parent rms and foreign
a¢ liates. Thus, the regressands in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 8 are FDI rmstotal capital stock
which is the sum of rms direct investment and the Chinese parent rms xed capital stock.
Third, we use a variable of licence costs (in log) to measure the investment xed costs in the
destination countries, which measure the average cost of getting a business licence in destination
countries and is reported by the project of Doing Business (2009) compiled by the World Bank.
Finally, the sample in Table 8 covers only Zhejiang province as introduced above.
27We recover the information of rms capital stock following the approach introduced by Brandt et al. (2012).
28Data on days of import document preparation in the destination country are from Doing Business Projects
complied by the World Bank (various years).
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To conduct the empirical analysis, we include log licence cost and its interaction with the
SOE indicator as regressors. If the theoretical prediction gains support from the data, the
variable of licence cost is expect to be negative whereas its interaction with the SOE indicator
is anticipated to be positive, indicating that a decline in foreign investment xed costs leads
to a larger rm size, and the e¤ect is more pronounced for private MNCs than for state-owned
MNCs. The simple OLS estimates in Column (1) and the xed-e¤ects estimates in Column (2)
conrms such a theoretical prediction. As our model implicitly assume a substitute between
export and FDI, we thus drop distribution FDI but only keep production FDI (Tian and Yu,
2015). In all columns, we nd a negative sign of log licence costs and a positive sign of the
interaction term between log licence costs and the SOE indicator, which are exactly consistent
with our theoretical predictions. Finally, Columns (4)-(6) focus on Chinese parent rms only
and use log labor of Chinese parent rms as the regressands. The estimation results in Columns
(4)-(6) are qualitatively identical to those in columns (1)-(3).
[Insert Table 8 Here]
5.4 Estimates with size premium
Proposition 3 predicts that relative size premium of state-owned MNCs. State-owned MNCs
relative to state-owned non-exporting rms are expected to have a larger size ratio than those
of private MNCs relative to of private non-exporting rms. Section 2 provides some preliminary
statistical evidence. In this sub-section we further to provide some rigorous empirical evidence
to validate such a theoretical prediction.
We start with the following empirical specication:
(lojt=l
d
jt) = 0 + 1SOEIntjt + 2rjt + t + i + "it (23)
where lojt and l
d
jt represents log labor of FDI rms and that of non-exporting rms for rm type
j (i.e., private or state-owned), respectively. Thus, the regressand in (23) measures industrial
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FDI relative size. SOEIntjt denotes the SOE intensity which is dened as the number of SOEs
divided by the number of total manufacturing rms in industry j at year t. rjt is average
measured interest rate in industry j at year t. Finally, the error term is decomposed into three
components: (1) year-specic xed e¤ects t to control for industry-invariant factors such as
Chinese RMB appreciation after 2005; (2) industry-specic xed e¤ects, and (3) an idiosyncratic
e¤ect "it with normal distribution to control for some other unspecied factors. If proposition
3 is supported by data, we should observe a positive coe¢ cient of SOEIntjt: the higher the
industrial SOE intensity, the larger is the state-owned FDI size premium. The xed-e¤ects
estimates in column (1) of Table 9 clearly suggest that industries with higher SOE intensity
have larger FDI size premium.
Similarly, if an industry with lower capital input cost (i.e., lower interest rate), rms in the
industry will have a larger prot which would in turn a¤ects its industrial FDI size premium.
Column (2) regresses FDI relative size on industrial interest rate and found that a lower industrial
interest rate is associated with larger industrial FDI relative size premium. Column (3) includes
both interest rate and SOE intensity as regressors and still yields similar results.
More interestingly, one of the key ideas in the present paper is that distortions in input
factor market lead to state-owned MNC relative size premium. Thus, it is important to see how
the di¤erence in interest rates between SOEs and private rms, rSOEjt   rPRIV ATEjt , a¤ects the
di¤erence in FDI relative size premium ((lo=ld)SOEjt   (lo=ld)PRIV ATEjt ). The last prediction in
Proposition 4 suggests that the FDI relative size premium di¤erential between SOEs and private
rms will be more pronounced when the distortions in domestic input markets deteriorate.
If such a theoretical prediction is supported by data, a smaller di¤erence in interest rates
should lead to less FDI relative size premium. We thus perform the following specications in
Columns (4)-(8) of Table 9:
(lo=ld)SOEjt   (lo=ld)PRIV ATEjt = 0 + 1(rSOEjt   rPRIV ATEjt ) + jt: (24)
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The industries in estimates of Columns (4) and (5) are dened at 2-digit Chinese-industrial
classications (CIC) level. We also provide some robustness checks in Columns (5) and (6) by
dening industries at the 4-digit CIC level. As not every 4-digit industry has outward FDI,
the numbers of observations in Columns (6)-(8) are smaller than those in Columns (1)-(5). The
estimates in Columns (5) and (7) also control for industrial relative TFP. In addition, Column (8)
controls for both year-specic and industry-specic xed e¤ects. It turns out that the coe¢ cient
of ^1 is always positive and statistically signicant, suggesting that the di¤erence in interest
rates is positively associated to the di¤erence in FDI relative size premium.
Our last interest is to discuss the economic magnitude of the key estimated coe¢ cient ^1.
As the mean of the di¤erence in interest rates is around 0.30 and that of the FDI relative size
premium di¤erential is 0.08, the contribution of interest rates di¤erential to the di¤erence in
FDI relative size premium is around 7.5% which is obtained from 0:020:30=0:08. So, if there is
no domestic discrimination of interest rates against private rms, the state-owned FDI relative
size premium will fall around 8 percent.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we utilize data on Chinese MNCs to study how distortions (i.e., discrimination
against private rms) in the domestic market a¤ect rmsFDI decisions. We rst document
three puzzling stylized facts. First, private MNCs are less productive than state-owned FDI
rms, although private non-FDI rms are more productive than state-owned non-FDI rms.
Second, SOEs are less likely to undertake FDI, even though they are bigger and receive various
supports from the government for investing abroad. Third, relative size of state-owned FDI rms
(compared with non-exporting rms) is larger than that of private FDI rms. We then build
up a model to rationalize these ndings and highlight a key channel through which distortions
a¤ect rms FDI decisions. Distortions in the domestic market incentivize private rms to invest
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and produce abroad, which results in less tougher selection into the FDI market for them. In
addition, compared with state-owned MNCs, private MNCs allocate output disproportionately
more in the foreign market, and their size increases disproportionately when they become MNCs.
All the empirical predictions of the model receive support from the data.
We believe that this paper is a start of our research agenda on how outward FDI and
MNCs from developing economies behave di¤erently from those from developed economies. At
the micro-level, how do these di¤erences impact rm productivity and rm-level R&D. At the
macro-level, how do these di¤erences a¤ect misallocation, aggregate TFP and welfare quantita-
tively is also worth exploring. At the same time, more data on MNCs of developing economies
are becoming available. Our work points out one important aspect of these rmsinvestment
behavior and deserves more attention in future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Data Description
This appendix draw heavily from Tian and Yu (2015).
FDI Decision Data. The nationwide data set of Chinese rmsFDI decisions was obtained
from the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOC). MOC requires every Chinese FDI rm to report
its detailed investment activity since 1980. To invest abroad, every Chinese rm is required
by the government to apply to the MOC and its former counterpart, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation of China, for approval and registration. MOC requires such
rms to provide the following information: the rms name, the names of the rms foreign
subsidiaries, the type of ownership (i.e., state-owned enterprise (SOE) or private rm), the
investment mode (e.g., trading-oriented a¢ liates, mining-oriented a¢ liates), and the amount
of foreign investment (in U.S. dollars). Once a rms application is approved by MOC, MOC
will release the information mentioned above, as well as other information, such as the date of
approval and the date of registration abroad, to the public. All such information is available
except the amount of the rms investment, which is considered to be condential information
to the rms.
Since 1980, MOC has released information on new FDI rms every year. Thus, the nation-
wide FDI decision data indeed report FDI starters by year. The database even reports specic
modes of investment: trading o¢ ce, wholesale center, production a¢ liate, foreign resource uti-
lization, processing trade, consulting service, real estate, research and development center, and
other unspecied types. Here trading o¢ ces and wholesale centers are classied as distribution
FDI, whereas the rest are referred to as non-distribution FDI. However, since this data set does
not report rmsFDI ows, researchers are not able to explore the intensive margin of rm FDI
with this data set.
FDI Flow Data. To explore the intensive margin, we use another data set, which is
compiled by the Department of Commerce of Zhejiang province. The most novel aspect of
this data set is that it includes data on rmsFDI ows (in current U.S. dollars). The data set
covers all rms with headquarters located (and registered) in Zhejiang and is a short, unbalanced
panel from 2006 to 2008. In addition to the variables covered in the nationwide FDI data set,
the Zhejiang data set provides each rms name, city where it has its headquarters, type of
ownership, industry classication, investment destination countries, and stock share from its
Chinese parent company.
Although this data set seems ideal for examining the role of the intensive margin of rm FDI,
the disadvantage is also obvious: the data set is for only one province in China.29 Regrettably, as
is the case for many other researchers, we cannot access similar databases from other provinces.
Still, as discussed in Appendix C, we believe that Zhejiangs rm-level FDI ow data are a good
proxy for understanding the universal Chinese rms FDI ows. In particular, the FDI ows
from Zhejiang province are outstanding in the whole of China; the distribution of both types of
ownership and that of Zhejiangs FDI rmsdestinations and industrial distributions are similar
to those for the whole of China.
Firm-Level Production Data. Our last database is the rm-level production data com-
piled by Chinas National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises.
The data set covers around 162,885 rms in 2000 and 410,000 rms in 2008 and, on average,
accounts for 95 percent of Chinas total annual output in all manufacturing sectors. The data
set includes two types of manufacturing rms: universal SOEs and non-SOEs whose annual sales
29To our knowledge, almost all previous work was not able to access nationwide universal outward FDI ow
data. An outstanding exception is Wang et al. (2012), who use nationwide rm-level outward FDI data to
investigate the driving force of outward FDI of Chinese rms. However, the study uses data only from 2006 to
2007; hence, it cannot explore the possible e¤ects of the nancial crisis in 2008.
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are more than RMB 5 million (or equivalently $830,000 under the current exchange rate). The
data set is particularly useful for calculating measured total factor productivity (TFP), since the
data set provides more than 100 rm-level variables listed in the main accounting statements,
such as sales, capital, labor, and intermediate inputs.
As highlighted by Feenstra et al. (2014) and Yu (2015), some samples in this rm-level
production data set are noisy and somewhat misleading, largely because of mis-reporting by
some rms. To guarantee that our estimation sample is reliable and accurate, we screen the
sample and omit outliers by adopting the following criteria. First, we eliminate a rm if its
number of employees is less than eight workers, since otherwise such an entity would be identied
as self-employed. Second, a rm is included only if its key nancial variables (e.g., gross value
of industrial output, sales, total assets, and net value of xed assets) are present. Third, we
include rms based on the requirements of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.30
Data Merge. We then merge the two rm-level FDI data sets (i.e., nationwide FDI decision
data and Zhejiangs FDI ow data) with the manufacturing production database. Although
the two data sets share a common variable the rms identication number their cFDIng
systems are completely di¤erent. Hence, we use alternative methods to merge the three data
sets. The matching procedure involves three steps. First, we match the three data sets (i.e., rm
production data, nationwide FDI decision data, and Zhejiang FDI ow data) by using each rms
Chinese name and year. If a rm has an exact Chinese name in a particular year in all three data
sets, it is considered an identical rm. Still, this method could miss some rms since the Chinese
name for an identical company may not have the exact Chinese characters in the two data sets,
although they share some common strings.31 Our second step is to decompose a rm name into
several strings referring to its location, industry, business type, and specic name, respectively.
If a company has all identical strings, such a rm in the three data sets is classied as an identical
rm.32 Finally, to avoid possible mistakes, all approximate string-matching procedures are done
manually.
7.2 Appendix B: Distortions in the Product Market
In this subsection of the appendix, we explore how discriminations against private rms and
liberalization on foreign investment a¤ect MNCs behavior in the domestic as well as global
markets. We will show that the main economic insights and testable predictions are the same
as the ones derived in the main model
The key idea is that a larger scale production (owing to investing in the foreign market)
helps private enterprises compete against SOEs in the global market, since going aborad helps
private rms get rid of discriminations. In order to make this point as transparent as possible,
we build up a model focusing on domestic production and FDI only in this subsection. Second,
we assume that average cost of overall production is an increasing function of total output q,
which takes the form of q2' in this subsection. As a result, production decisions in the domestic
market and the foreign market are made jointly.
30 In particular, an observation is included in the sample only if the following observations hold: (1) total assets
are greater than liquid assets; (2) total assets are greater than the total xed assets and the net value of xed
assets; (3) the established time is valid (i.e., the opening month should be between January and December); and
(4) the rms sales must be higher than the required threshold of RMB 5 million.
31For example, "Ningbo Hangyuan communication equipment trading company" shown in the FDI data set
and "(Zhejiang) Ningbo Hangyuan communication equipment trading company" shown in the National Bureau
of Statistics of China production data set are the same company but do not have exactly the same Chinese
characters.
32 In the example above, the location fragment is "Ningbo," the industry is "communication equipment," the
business type is "trading company," and the specic name is "Hangyuan."
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We analyze the behavior of the SOE rst. If an SOE only serves the domestic market, its
operating prot is
qHCH  
q2H
2'
  fD; (25)
while the prot is
qHCH + q

FCF  
(qH + qF )
2
2'
  fD   fI ; (26)
if it serves both markets. Finally, the two countries are assumed to be symmetric for simplicity
in this subsection, and we normalize the wage rate in the two countries to one, which justify the
above prot functions.
Based on the above simplifying assumption, we can derive the domestic SOEs nal prot
as
SD(') =

1  
2

(')
 1
+1C
2
+1   fD; (27)
where C  CH = CF . Output in the domestic market is
qSD(') = (C')

+1 : (28)
Output decision of the multinational SOE is more involved. However, the assumption of two
symmetric countries substantially simplies the analysis. First, symmetry implies output are
equalized across borders:
qH(') = qF ('):
Based on this result, we can rewrite the multinational SOEs optimization problem as
max
q
q
 1
 2
1
C   q
2)
2'
  fD   fI ;
which results in the following nal prot:
SO(') =
h
1  
2
i
(')
 1
+1 2
2
+1C
2
+1   fD   fI : (29)
Output in both the domestic market and the foreign market is
qSOD(') = qSOF (') =
C'
2
 
+1
< qSD('); (30)
and total output is
qSO(') = 2
1
+1 (C')

+1 > qSD('): (31)
Since average cost increases in output, domestic output falls when an SOE becomes an MNE.
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we model discriminations against private rms as dis-
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tortions in the product market in this section. Specically, we assume that the home government
takes c 1c (c > 1) fraction of the revenue earn from the domestic market from private rms. As
a result, the prot function of a domestic private rm is
1
c
q
 1

H E
1

HP
 1

H  
q2H
2'
  fD; (32)
which leads the optimal output as
qPD(') =
C'
c
 
+1
(33)
and the nal prot as
PD(') =
h
1  
2
i'
c
 1
+1 C
2
+1
c
  fD: (34)
The interesting question is how a multinational private rm allocates its output across bor-
ders. We can write the objective function of such a rm as
max
q;s
h(1  s) 1
c
+ s
 1

i
qC   q
2
2'
; (35)
where s is the share of output allocated in the foreign market. First, given the total output q,
the optimal allocation is
s(c) =
c
1 + c
>
1
2
; (36)
which increases in c. A more distorted domestic market incentivizes the private rm to sell dis-
proportionately more in the foreign market. Next, after substituting equation (36) into equation
(35), we can rewrite the objective function dened in equation (35) as
max
q
h 1 + c 1
c
i
qC   q
2
2'
; (37)
which leads to the solution as
qPO(') = (1 + c)
1
+1
C'
c
 
+1
: (38)
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As a result, output allocated to the domestic market is
qPOD(') =
1
(1 + c)

+1
C'
c
 
+1
; (39)
and the nal prot is
PO(') =
 
1 + c
 2
+1
c
h
1  
2
i'
c
 1
+1
C
2
+1   fD   fI : (40)
Now, we are in the position to characterize how distortions a¤ect the sorting patter of MNCs
and how an improvement in distortions a¤ect the behavior of private MNCs. First, following
the literature, we assume that the xed cost of doing FDI is higher enough such that only the
most productive rms choose to do FDI. Next, we use the following proposition to summarize
our main theoretical results.
Proposition 5 The exit cuto¤ and the cuto¤ for becoming an MNE are higher for private rms
than for SOEs. Next, suppose the initial productivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution
(for private rms and SOEs) except that the minimum productivity level can di¤er. Then,
the fraction of MNCs is bigger among private enterprises than among SOEs. Furthermore,
the average rm size (i.e., revenue or employment) of private MNCs is smaller than that of
multinational SOEs. After distortions are mitigated in the domestic market (i.e., c goes down),
the share of private MNCs decreases.
Proof. Dene 'ij where i 2 fS; Pg and j 2 fD;Og as the cuto¤ for exiting or becoming an
MNE for the SOE and the private rm. Based on equations (27), (29), (34), (40), we have
'SD =
 
fD
1  2


 1
+1C
2
+1
!+1
 1
=
'PD
c
2
 1
;
fD
 
'SO
'SD
! 1
+1
(2
2
+1   1) = fI (41)
and
fD
 
'PO
'PD
! 1
+1 h
(1 + c)
2
+1   1
i
= fI : (42)
Based on equations (41) and (42)), we can derive the cuto¤s for becoming an MNE as
'SO = 'SD
( fIfD )
+1
 1
(2
2
+1   1)+1 1
;
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and
'PO = 'PD
( fIfD )
+1
 1
[(1 + c)
2
+1   1]+1 1
:
Therefore, we must have
'PD > 'SD;
'PO
'PD
<
'SO
'SD
:
Furthermore, the cuto¤ for becoming an MNE for private rms can be expressed as
'PO = 'SD
 fI
fD
+1
 1 c
2
 1
[(1 + c)
2
+1   1]+1 1
: (43)
Since
c
2
 1
[(1 + c)
2
+1   1]+1 1
>
1
(2
2
+1   1)+1 1
;
we must have:
'PO > 'SO:
For the result on the comparison of average rm size, it is su¢ cient to show that rm size
of the marginal private MNE is strictly smaller than the marginal multinational SOE, since '
follows a Pareto distribution and the resulting rm size (i.e., revenue or employment) is a log-
linear transformation of '. First, we use S(') to dene revenue of a rm with the productivity
draw of '. Second, for the marginal rms we have
S('PD) = S('SD) =
fD
1  2
:
Third, based on equations (27), (29), (34), (40), (41) and (42), we derive that
S('SO) =
fD
1  2
2
2
+1
fI
fD
(2
2
+1   1)
and
S('PO) =
fD
1  2
(1 + c)
2
+1
fI
fD
[(1 + c)
2
+1   1]
:
Obviously, S('SO) > S('PO), which establishes our result for revenue. Note that total wage
payment is a xed fraction of revenue, and the wage rate paid by SOEs and private rms is the
same. Therefore, employment of the marginal private MNE is smaller than that of the marginal
multinational SOE, which establishes our result for employment.
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For the nal part of this proposition, we have
d['PO='PD]
dc
< 0;
which establishes the result.
The intuition for the above proposition is straightforward. First, since private rms face
tougher market environment at home, the cuto¤s for survival and becoming an MNE are higher
for them. However, the attractiveness of becoming an MNE is higher for private rms, since
going abroad not only presents them another market to make prots, but also makes them be
subject to less distortions (i.e., institutional arbitrage). As a result, the share of MNCs is bigger
for private rms. Although a decrease in the misallocation parameter does not a¤ect the share
of MNCs for SOEs, it reduces this share for private enterprises, as the attractiveness of going
abroad decreases. Finally, since private rms face distortions in the domestic market, and there
are relative more private rms going abroad, the average rm size of private MNCs is smaller
than that of SOEs.
Proposition 6 Suppose after fI decreases, one SOE and one private enterprise that have exact
the same productivity, ', become MNCs. Overall rm size increases more for the private rm
than for the SOE, while domestic sales shrink more for the private rm than for the SOE.
Proof. Based on equations (28), (31), (33), (38), wee have
1 <
qSO(')
qSD(')
= 2
1
+1 <
qPO(')
qPD(')
= (1 + c)
1
+1 :
Thus, overall rm size increases more for the private rm than for the SOE. From equations
(28), (30), (33), (39), we have
1 >
qSOD(')
qSD(')
=
1
2
 
+1
>
qPOD(')
qPD(')
=
1
(1 + c)

+1
:
Therefore, the shrinking of domestic sales is larger for the private rm than for the SOE.
The intuition for the above proposition is straightforward. Since there is an extra benet for
private rms to go abroad, the increase in overall rm size is bigger for them as well (i.e., the
size e¤ect). When private rms become MNCs, they produce and sell disproportionately more
in the foreign market owing to the non-existence of distortions in that market. In total, this
reallocation e¤ect dominates the size e¤ect which makes the domestic sales of private MNCs
drop more.
The above result implies that which part of rm sales we use is crucial when we calculate
the degree of misallocation.
Think about a private rm which has a better productivity draw than an SOE. After investing
abroad becomes easier (owing to liberalization on foreign investment ows), both rms become
MNCs. If we only take into account their domestic sales, we must conclude that the market
share of the less productive SOE actually increases relative to the more productive private rm.
However, when we take into account both their domestic sales and foreign sales, we will conclude
that the global market share of the less productive SOE decreases relative to the more productive
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private rm. Therefore, we should be more careful when we evaluate how misallocation changes
after liberalization on foreign investment ows.
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables (2000-08)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Firm TFP (Olley-Pakes) 3.61 1.18 0.61 6.57
Firm FDI indicator 0.004 0.066 0 1
Firm export indicator 0.29 0.451 0 1
SOE indicator 0.05 0.219 0 1
Foreign indicator 0.20 0.402 0 1
Firm log labor 4.78 1.115 1.61 13.25
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